that is wielded by the use of weapons is not exercised within relations of power but
through relations of violence.
7
While we may thus comprehend how Foucault distances his analysis of power
from the sovereign model – whether we agree with it or not – another problem still
remains: that of understanding the prohibitions that exist in actuality. For Foucault,
prohibitions are just one of the multiple possible effects of power. What is important to
realize is that “the interdiction, the refusal, the prohibition, far from being essential forms
of power, are only its limits: the frustrated or extreme forms of power. The relations of
power are, above all, productive” (FL: 220). And Foucault considers this analysis of
“effects of power and the production of ‘truth’ ” to be his primary project. Foucault
explicates that power relations
do not simply play a facilitating or obstructing role with respect to knowledge; they
do not merely encourage or stimulate it, distort or restrict it; … so the problem is not
just to determine how power subordinates knowledge and makes it serve its ends or
how it superimposes itself on it, imposing ideological contents and limitations. No
knowledge is formed without a system of communication, registration,
accumulation, and displacement that is in itself a form of power, linked in its
existence and its functioning to other forms of power. No power, on the other hand,
is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution, or restraint of a
knowledge. At this level there is not knowledge [connaissance] on one side and
society on the other, or science and the state, but the basic forms of “power-
knowledge” [“pouvoir-savoir”]. (EW1: 17)
In other words, power and knowledge work together, supporting and drawing from each
other. To put it differently, “Foucault’s view is that mechanisms of power produce
7
See for example Foucault’s (1982) discussion of slavery in ‘Subject and Power.’ Foucault states, “slavery
is not a power relationship when man is in chains. (In this case, it is a question of a physical relationship of
constraint.)” (SP: 221).
Of course Foucault can be criticized on this, and Agamben (1998) does criticize him in this context.
But at the present moment, for the purpose of my analysis I would like to remain within the Foucauldian
framework, simply because any violent exercise of power is not really relevant in my biopolitical analysis,
as will become clear later.